What makes deterrence credible? by GEORGOSOULI, A
5 October 2015. CCLS Working Paper (research work in progress). Please do not cite without author’s permission. 
1 
 
What makes deterrence credible? 
Dr Andromachi Georgosouli* 
 
According to current orthodoxy deterrence is credible when it is visible and visibility calls for 
enforcement action that is harsh enough to be taken seriously so that it makes an impact on the 
behaviour of the industry.  In this chapter, I argue that the focus on enforcement is misplaced 
because, when it comes to the question of ‘credibility’, at best it tells half the story. The 
credibility of deterrence is contingent to a multitude of factors. In this chapter, I consider three 
of them all of which are closely inter-related: The regulator’s capacity to attain a congruence of 
‘minds’ and a congruence of ‘hearts’ and the regulator’s ability to harness its profile as a credible 
enforcer. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
According to current orthodoxy deterrence is credible when it is visible and visibility calls for 
enforcement action that is harsh enough to be taken seriously so that it makes an impact on the 
behaviour of the industry.1 In this chapter, I do not intend to doubt the role of enforcement in 
deterrence policy but to argue that the focus on enforcement is misplaced because, when it comes 
to the question of ‘credibility’, at best it tells half the story. The picture is far more complex because 
the credibility of deterrence is contingent to a multitude of factors. In this chapter, I consider three 
of them all of which are closely inter-related: The regulator’s capacity to attain a congruence of 
‘minds’ and a congruence of ‘hearts’ and the regulator’s ability to harness its profile as a ‘credible 
enforcer’. 
It is a good time to consider this theme. In June 2015 IOSCO published a paper on ‘Credible 
Deterrence in the Enforcement of Securities Regulation’. IOSCO identifies seven factors that make 
deterrence credible. These are the following: (a) legal certainty, (b) capacity of being able to get the 
right information, (c) co-operation and collaboration; (d) investigation and prosecution of 
misconduct; (e) strong punishment through the imposition of sanctions; (f) promoting public 
understanding and transparency and (g) good regulatory governance in order to deliver better 
enforcement. The IOSCO recommendations seem to be premised on the assumption that the 
credibility of deterrence can be strengthened as long as we can take measures to improve the 
effectiveness of enforcement.2 This paper warns that improvements on enforcement can actually 
have no positive impact on the credibility of deterrence. More generally, it is essential to keep in 
mind that the effectiveness of enforcement and the effectiveness of deterrence are not one and the 
same thing. The effectiveness of enforcement can be measured by the number of successful 
enforcement proceedings irrespective of whether enforcement inflicts behaviour modification. By 
contrast, deterrence is not successful unless there is some evidence of behaviour modification. In 
                                                          
*Dr Andromachi Georgosouli (a.georgosouli@qmul.ac.uk), Senior Lecturer, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, QMUL. I 
wish to thank ….for their feedback on earlier versions of this chapter. Any errors remain my own.  
1 See notably, G. Wilson and S. Wilson, ‘The FSA, “Credible Deterrence, and Criminal Enforcement –a “haphazard pursuit”?’ 
(2014) 21(1) 21(1) Journal of Financial Crime 4-28; and T. McDermot (acting director of the Enforcement and Financial 
Crime Division) ‘Credible Deterrence: Here to Stay’, FSA Speech (FSA Enforcement Conference; 2 July 2012) [available at 
http://www.fsac.org.uk/library/communication/speeches/2012/0702-tm.html]. 
2 IOSCO ‘Credible Deterrence in the Enforcement of Securities Regulation’ (June 2015) [available at: 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD490.pdf]. 
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view of this, the credibility of deterrence (and by implication its effectiveness) is to be measured in 
terms of how well the regulator actually does in attuning industry incentives with those of the 
regulator in the medium and long term.  
For expository purposes, examples are drawn from the work of the Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA) and where appropriate the work of the predecessor of the FCA, the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) in deterring misconduct in the financial services sector.3 This chapter does not offer a 
comprehensive account of all those market, institutional, legal, behavioural and cognitive conditions 
that make deterrence credible and it does not provide all the answers. However, it highlights certain 
determinants of deterrence, which point to pathways for reform. Although the aim of this chapter is 
not to offer a critique of the IOSCO recommendations, its findings may help put the IOSCO 
recommendations in context and understand how these recommendations might be further refined 
in the future.  
Deterrence studies go in hand with regulatory scholarship on enforcement and compliance focusing 
in particular on regulatory approaches that subscribe to the idea that ‘prevention is better than 
cure’.4 The aim of deterrence strategy is to dissuade market actors from breaching the law in the 
future, while at the same time preventing others from committing similar breaches. Over the years, 
these studies have been influenced by two schools of thought. On the one hand those who believe 
that market actors will comply with the law only when confronted with tough sanctions and, on the 
other hand, those who believe that persuasion works better in securing long term compliance. More 
recently, these strands of thought gave rise to hybrid accounts of deterrence strategies as it has 
been increasingly recognised that better results may be achieved when regulatory approaches 
combine elements of both. Hybrid strategies are considered to be pragmatic because the industry 
sometimes is motivated by making money and sometimes is motivated by a sense of social 
responsibility.5 
The deterrence policy of the FCA combines both elements of punishment and persuasion, although 
more recently there is a clear emphasis of the FCA as an ‘enforcement-led’ regulator.6 More 
generally the idea of enforcement as the catalyst for credible deterrence is as powerful as never 
before finding also the official endorsement of IOSCO. Below, I put this view into test and, 
progressively, I bring attention to other factors that impact on the credibility of deterrence. I 
                                                          
3 As of April 2013, the FSA was abolished and replaced by the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) and the Prudential 
Regulation Authority (“PRA”), the latter being a subsidiary of the Bank of England. The FCA and the PRA are focus-specific 
with a separate set of statutory objectives to deliver.  They are operationally independent and at least on paper of equal 
institutional standing.  The strategic objective of the FCA is to ensure that financial markets function well (Financial Services 
Act 2012 section 1B(2) (amending Financial Services and Markets Act 2000). To this effect, the FCA is responsible for 
consumer protection, market integrity, and competition in the interests of consumers (FSA 2012, sections 1B(2), 1(C), 1D, 
1E. The PRA is the primary micro-prudential regulator and part of its mandate is to offer a helping hand to the Financial 
Policy Committee of the Bank of England in delivering its financial stability objective (FSA 2012 section 2B (“The PRA’s 
general objective”). See further, A Georgosouli, ‘The FCA-PRA coordination scheme and the challenge of policy coherence’, 
(2013) 8(1) Capital Markets Law Journal, pp. 62-76. 
4 For an overview of the literature on compliance and enforcement part of which is the theme of deterrence see, B. 
Morgan and K. Yeung, ‘An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Texts, Cases and Materials (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; 2007) chapter 4 pages 151-217. 
5 Braithwaite, To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985) B. 
Morgan and K. Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Texts, Cases and Materials (2007) at 194-195. 
6 R. Tomasic, (2011) ‘The financial crisis and the haphazard pursuit of financial crime’ (2011) 18(1) Journal of Financial 
Crime 7-31 (discussing the nature of the regulatory change by focusing on financial crime). 
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conclude with a summary of the main points of this analysis and further reflections on the direction 
of future reform.  
 
2. Recent trends in the deterrence strategy of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
To understand the nature of the deterrence strategy of the FCA and, where relevant, of its 
predecessor the Financial Services Authority, it helps to draw a distinction between two different 
conceptions of deterrence: Positive deterrence and negative deterrence. The distinctive feature of 
positive deterrence is its emphasis on voluntary adherence with regulatory stipulations. The idea 
here is that prevention of misconduct is happening out the initiative of the industry and not as a 
result of coercion typically in the form of enforcement action instigated by the regulator. Positive 
deterrence comes in hand with forms of self-governance, ethics and business culture.7 Under this 
approach enforcement is not precluded but it is nevertheless seen as a necessary evil and as a 
means of last result when all other informal and voluntary avenues of remedial action have failed to 
secure some form of appropriate financial redress to aggrieved parties. Negative deterrence stands 
at the other side of the spectrum. Its distinctive feature of negative deterrence is its reliance on 
enforcement, its strong association with traditional command and control regulation and the view of 
the financial regulator as ‘enforcement-led’ regulator. 
 
The UK regulator did not always give emphasis to negative deterrence strategies, however, more 
recently, there has been a consistent and deliberate endeavor to forge the profile of the UK 
regulator as enforcement led regulator. This started off as early as 2007, when the FSA launched its 
‘credible deterrence’ strategy. This trend continues today by the FCA and it is manifested in two key 
developments. On the one hand, the granting of more enforcement and interventionist powers to 
the UK regulator and, on the other hand, the increase of disciplinary and enforcement actions. 
 
At least on paper, the FCA enjoys a wider range of disciplinary and enforcement powers compared 
to its predecessor.8 The FCA has, inter alia, the power to (a) impose administrative fines, (b) 
withdraw authorisation and permissions, (c) apply for injunctions and restitution orders, and (d) 
prosecute certain criminal offences.9 In addition, the new section 138D (former section 150) 
establishes a civil law remedy for aggrieved parties to seek compensation.10 To ensure that the 
regulator’s disciplinary action will be visible enough to have an impact on the conduct of market 
actors, new section 391 (1ZB) also enables the FCA to publish information about warning notices in 
                                                          
7 H. Becker, ‘Culture: A Sociological View’ (1982) 71 Yale Law Review 513 (describing culture as shared understandings that 
permit a group of people to act in concert with each other); J. O’Brien, G. Gilligan and S. Miller, ‘Culture and the Future of 
Financial Regulation: How to Embed Restraint in the Interests of Systemic Stability’, (2014) 8(2) Law and Financial Markets 
Review 115-133 at 126 (identifying five sources of cultures); Jasper Sorensen, The Strength of Corporate Culture and 
Reliability of Firm Performance, (2002) 47(1) Administrative Science Quarterly 70-91 at 72 (offering a narrow definition of 
culture as a system of shared values). 
8 See Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, Part XI (Information Gathering and Investigations) and Part XIV (Disciplinary 
Powers) (as amended by the Financial Services Act 2012). 
9 See FCA, Enforcement Information Guide (2013) [available at http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/enforcement-
information-guide]. 
10 Only “private persons” are eligible to make use of this statutory civil law remedy. See FSMA 2000 (Rights of Actions), 
2001, S.I. 2001/544 (U.K.); Titan Steel Wheels Ltd. v. The Royal Bank of Scot. PLC, [2010] EWHC (Comm) 211, [76] (Eng.) 
(finding a corporation did not qualify to bring an action under section 150 of the original FSMA 2000 because it was acting 
in the course of business); Figurasin v. Cent. Capital Ltd., [2014] EWCA (Civ) 504 (Eng.). 
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certain cases.11 Other key elements of the new strategy is the novel powers of product intervention. 
The availability of those powers may also be explained in terms of the endeavour of the legislator to 
improve the regulator’s capability of deterring future misconduct. 12 Product intervention powers are 
quite controversial but the regulator need not exercise these powers. Suffice is to demonstrate a 
serious intention to do this in the future in view of repeated industry failings to provide products 
that are suitable to their clients.  
 
There is a notable increase of the rate of enforcement action over the past seven years. The 
imposition of record fines on Alliance and Leicester for serious failings in the selling of Payment 
Protection Insurance (PPI) back in 2007 has been a milestone underlying a notable change of 
attitude which was crystallized over the subsequent years.13 The GMAC is another case  that offers a 
clear testament to this wind of change. 14 So, it does the impressive volume of Final Notices, Decision 
Notices, the aggregate amount financial penalties imposed on individuals and firms and the number 
of prohibitions and criminal convictions during 2010 - 2012. 15 More recently, the imposition of a 
record fine of £284m on Barclays Bank plc has been celebrated as further cementing the role of the 
FCA as ‘enforcement-led’ regulator.16  
These developments in the deterrence strategy of the FSA and more recently the FCA underscore 
the key role of enforcement in the delivery of credible deterrence. As the argument goes, heavy 
fines are expected to make a difference and to drive change in the financial services sector, 
however, the latest experience with the FCA casts doubt on the potency of enforcement in 
enhancing the credibility of deterrence. This is further explained below. 
 
 
                                                          
11 The FSA’s use of these powers has already been challenged by way of judicial review and in the Upper Tribunal. See R ex 
rel. S v. X, [2011] EWHC (Admin) 1645, [4]–[10] (Eng.) (addressing the claimant’s appeal of the FSA’s decision notice to the 
Upper Tribunal and granting an interim injunction to restrain the FSA from publishing the notice); R ex rel. Can. Inc. v. FSA, 
[2011] EHWC (Admin) 2766 (Eng.). 
12 Financial Services Act 2012, new section 137D (FCA general rules: product intervention), new section 137R (Financial 
promotion rules) new section 137 S (Financial promotion: directions given by the FCA). Some of the FCA’s key priorities in 
respect to consumer credit reveal the intention of the UK regulator to make use of its new powers. These priorities include 
(a) the review of financial promotions, (b) the improvement of debt management standards, (c) considering the 
introduction of price caps on what payday lenders can actually charge, (d) assessing regularly how the industry treats 
financial difficulties, and (e) getting a better understanding of the economic behavior of consumers. FCA, Business Plan 
2014/15 (2014) [available at http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/ corporate/business-plan-2014-2015.pdf.] 
13 A&L was fined £7,000,000. Post crisis, financial firms were made to pay much higher fines. See FCA Press Release, FCA 
Fines Lloyds Banking Group First a Total of £28,038,800 for Serious Sales Incentive Failings (Nov. 12, 2013), [available at 
http://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-fines-lloyds-banking-group-firms-for-serious-sales-incentive-failings; Final 
Notice from Fin. Conduct Auth. to Lloyds TSB Bank plc and Bank of Scotland plc (Dec. 10, 2013) [available at 
http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/final-notices/2013/lloyds-tsb-bank-and-bank-of-scotland.] 
14 GMAC was a non-bank lender in the prime, sub-prime and buy to let mortgage sectors. The disciplinary action focused 
on failures with respect to MCOB and the proper implementation of TCF. The GMAC failings included excessive and unfair 
charges for customers; proposing repayment plans that were not suitable, and starting repossession proceedings before 
considering other alternatives. Apart from having to pay a fine of £4 million, like A&L, GMAC agreed to carry out a 
customer regress programme. See FSA Final Notice GMAC-RFC Ltd (October 28, 2009) [available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/final/gmac_rfc.pdf] and further, Compliance Officer Bulletin Issue 76 May 2010. 
15 T. McDermott (acting director of the Enforcement and Financial Crime Division), ‘Credible deterrence: here to stay’ FSA 
Speech (02 Jul 2012,  FSA’s Enforcement Conference) http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2012/0702-
tm.shtml 
16 The fines that were imposed on Barclays relate to the LIBOR scandal and in particular to the involvement of Barclays the 
Forex misconduct. M. Bonell, ‘Is credible deterrence really working? And other questions arising from a mixed week for the 
FCA’ (28 May, 2015) Financial Services Blog [available at 
http://www.rpc.co.uk/index.php?option=com_easyblog&view=entry&id=1518&Itemid=133].  
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3. Is enforcement making deterrence credible?  
A good starting point to consider this question is perhaps the experience with the imposition of the 
highest ever record fine upon Barclays Bank in 2015. It is interesting to note that many of Barclay’s 
failures in relation to FOREX came after a time when it should have been aware of the risks from 
such business. Barclays continued to behave badly despite the fact that it had already paid a fine for 
a similar misconduct. Moreover, Barclays continued to misbehave while been subject to fresh 
investigations about its involvement to the LIBOR scandal. According to the FCA Final Notice, 
Barclay’s failure to learn its lessons and adjust its business practices. This has been one of the 
aggravating factors that increased the penalty. Clearly, the probability of enforcement was not 
considered a credible threat in the circumstances and, by the FCA’s recent admission, nobody 
appears to have been deterred from anything or that it has learnt any lesson.17 At best, the threat of 
huge fines goes as far as to motivate the industry to cooperate during investigations and agree on an 
early settlement in the hope of getting at least the minimum discount that may be available to them. 
This is not deterrence. It is more accurate to say that this is an arrangement whereby market actors 
(and potentially future perpetrators of misconduct) buy out their freedom to continue misbehaving. 
The use of Final Notices is closely connected with enforcement and the regulator’s attempt to 
ensure that deterrence is credible. In theory, the publication of Final Notices serve to increase the 
visibility of the regulator’s intended disciplinary and enforcement action sending the message across 
that certain forms of misconduct will not be tolerated and that consequences will fall heavy to 
future wrongdoers. In practice, Final Notices can backfire. The Court of Appeal’s judgment in the 
case FCA v Macris [2015] EWCA Civ 490, which was handed down on 19 May 2015 is a case in point 
in this regard. The case concerns the giving of statutory enforcement notices to J P Morgan Chase 
Bank NA in relation to the involvement of the latter in ‘London Wale’ trades and the identification of 
Mr Macris. The Court of Appeal ruled that the FCA should have treated Mr Macris as a third party for 
the purposes of section 393 of FSMA so that Mr Macris had availed himself with certain rights before 
the issue of the Final Notice. The Court of Appeal concluded that Mr Macris was entitled to refer the 
Final Notice to the Upper Tribunal for a hearing as to whether the criticisms of him are appropriate. 
Although it is difficult to make safe projections about the future, it is clear that this decision opens a 
window of opportunity for other closed enforcement cases to be re-opened or for current 
proceedings to be disrupted by individuals asserting their third party rights. 
Enforcement can also backfire in a different way namely by creating bad press for the FCA. In its 
attempt to ensure that imminent enforcement action is loud enough to be considered a credible 
threat against the person who is subject to investigations, the regulator may be tempted to inflate 
the number of allegations against that person or it may even publish press statements that do not 
necessarily offer an accurate depiction of the case at stake. These scenario do not lie in the sphere of 
fantasy. For example, in Angela Burns v FCA [2015] UKUT 0252 (TCC) (FS/2012/0024), the FCA was 
successful, however the Upper Tribunal criticised the FCA for its unsatisfactory submissions on some 
points and for failing to reassess its position in the light of the fact that six out of its ten allegations 
had failed and out of the four allegations that were successful, three were upheld only to a limited 
extent. In Bayliss and Co (Financial Services) Ltd and Clive John Rosier v FCA [2015] UKUT 0265 (TCC 
                                                          
17 Commenting on the recent FRONTEX investigations, T. McDermot declared that ‘still lessons are not being learnt’ ‘[a]nd 
there have been all too many examples – in both the retail and wholesale space – to reinforce that view.’ T. McDermot, 
‘Learning the Lessons of the Past as an Industry’ (Speech, FCA Enforcement Conference: Our Part in Changing Culture, 2 
December 2014) [available at: http://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/learning-the-lessons-of-the-past-as-an-industry]. 
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(fs/2013/0004 and 005) the FCA was criticised inter alia about its handling of the press statement, 
which was sent to selected media outlets along with the decision notices issued to Bayliss and Mr 
Rosier. The Upper Tribunal noted that the FCA press statement contained inaccuracies and that it 
failed inter alia to emphasize the tentative nature of those notices. Although the FCA was successful 
in both occasions, the poor handling of the enforcement procedure does not aid the good reputation 
of the FCA as a regulator whom the industry can trust and cooperate with. This is not a trivial matter 
as both trust and cooperation are key for industry enrolment and long term behaviour modification.  
A conclusion to be drawn out of the analysis so far is that, thanks to the increased emphasis on 
enforcement, the FCA is making itself more visible and loud but, despite this visibility, it is doubtful 
that the FCA is doing better in deterring future misconduct.  Visibility is neither enough nor critical in 
securing the credibility of deterrence. Below, I consider three further aspects of regulatory strategy 
that impact on the credibility of deterrence: The regulator’s ability to attain a congruence of minds 
and congruence of hearts and its capacity to come across as a credible enforcer. 
 
4.  Rethinking the parameters that make deterrence credible 
 
(a) Deterrence is not credible, unless there is a congruence of ‘minds’ 
Deterrence cannot render long-term consistent results unless the business culture of the firms 
demonstrates a congruence of ‘minds’ between the regulator and the regulated industry about key 
problems and priorities. This idea is hardly new. In fact it is embedded in the very nature of both 
positive and negative deterrence strategies. While in the former case, this congruence of minds is 
the product of an effortless and voluntary endeavour to understand each other’s rationalities, in the 
case of negative deterrence this meeting of minds is enforced. Getting to congruence of minds calls 
for conversional capabilities and focus on culture. The Treating Customers Fairly Initiative (TCF) is a 
good example of how the FCA and, before the FCA, the FSA have been trying to embed 
conversational regulation and culture in their attempt to deter future misconduct. 18   
 
TCF asks the industry to work out what practices guarantee fair treatment for clients in a manner 
that is attuned to the policy goals and priorities of the regulator. These goals reflect Principle 6 
(customers’ interests) of the FCA Principles for Businesses, according to which “a firm must pay due 
regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly” and they are are encapsulated in the 
following six TCF outcomes:19 
“Outcome 1: Consumers can be confident that they are dealing with firms where the fair 
treatment of customers is central to the corporate culture.  
Outcome 2: Products and services marketed and sold in the retail market are designed to 
meet the needs of identified consumer groups and are targeted accordingly.  
Outcome 3: Consumers are provided with clear information and are kept appropriately 
informed before, during, and after the point of sale.  
                                                          
18 On TCF see generally A. Georgosouli, ‘The FSA’s ‘Treating Customers Fairly’ (TCF) Initiative: What is So Good About it and 
Why It May Not Work’ (2011) 38 (3) Journal of Law and Society 405-427. 
19 FSA, Treating Customers Fairly –A Guide to Management Information (2007) [available at http://www.fca.org.uk/ 
firms/being-regulated/meeting-your-obligations/fair-treatment-of-customers.pdf.].  
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Outcome 4: Where consumers receive advice, the advice is suitable and takes account of 
their circumstances.  
Outcome 5: Consumers are provided with products that perform as firms have led them to 
expect, and the associated service is of an acceptable standard.  
Outcome 6: Consumers do not face unreasonable post-sale barriers imposed by firms to 
change product, switch provider, submit a claim, or make a complaint.” 
 
TCF embraces self-regulation and assumes that the members of the regulatory community are 
capable of working out for themselves the public standards that ought to govern their relationships.  
It is not a new set of secondary legislation.  It is a guidance that reflects key elements of the UK 
regulator’s strategy in the retail financial sector.  The outcomes that firms are expected to deliver are 
communicated through informal means as, for example, Policy Statements (“PS”) and “Dear CEO 
Letters.”  From this, however, it does not follow that this otherwise informal guidance has no bearing 
on the taking of enforcement action since the TCF outcomes echo the FCA Principles for Business and 
other legally binding Handbook provisions.20 The proactive and reactive nature of the measures that 
comprise TCF have been discussed elsewhere and they will not be here reiterated. Instead, the 
remaining of this section focuses on the discursive practice that goes in hand with these measures.21  
 
Long-term cultural change is arguably impossible without industry engagement. The latter is deemed 
essential so that regulatees become more cognizant of their responsibilities and more sophisticated 
in sensing what TCF requires even in the presence of new or unforeseen circumstances.  Ideally, 
industry engagement should be self-initiated. There are benefits to be gained out of voluntary 
industry engagements. Regulatees who enjoy the discretion to decide how best to proceed in their 
attempt to incorporate TCF into their business culture are believed to be more likely to view TCF as 
reasonable and thus worthy of compliance. In the past (and to a large extent even today), the UK 
regulator encouraged this by offering to firms a  “regulatory dividend” in the form of less scrutiny, as 
an incentive to make them behave well demonstrating essentially that customer interests were 
central to the corporate culture of the business in question.22  Like its predecessor, the FCA follows 
this approach but it does not rely entirely on the initiative of senior managers to ensure that the 
business culture of their firm is consistent with TCF. Tools like the FCA’s ‘Culture Framework’ (CF) 
and ‘Management Information’ (MI) are deployed to help senior managers keep things in 
perspective, while at the same time making it possible for the FCA to get a more accurate view of the 
firm’s capacity to deliver TCF outcomes.23 The FCA supervises and monitors the implementation of 
these tools engaging the industry in an on-going dialogue where perceptions are questioned, 
challenged and where necessary revised.  
                                                          
20 E. Ferran, ‘Regulatory Lessons from the Payment Protection Insurance Mis-selling Scandal in the UK’ (2012) 13 European 
Business Law Review 247, 259 (characterizing the TCF outcomes as “non-binding guidance”). 
21  For a classic exposition of the nature of conversational regulation see J. Black ‘Regulatory Conversations’ (2002) Journal 
of Law and Society 163-196 and ‘Talking about Regulation’ (1998) Public Law 77-105. For a criticism see, A Georgosouli, 
‘Regulatory interpretation: Conversational or Constructive?’ (2010) 30 (2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 361-384. 
22 A. Georgosouli, C. Russo and P. Rawlings, Regulation of Financial Services: Aims and Methods (CCLS Research Paper, April 
2014) [available at: http://www.ccls.qmul.ac.uk/docs/research/138683.pdf.] (noting that this policy reflected an 
assumption that the vast majority of firms had the intention to treat their customers fairly and that the majority were 
willing to engage openly and positively with the regulator and arguing that both assumptions proved to be naïve in reality). 
23 FCA, TCF Culture, (Apr. 5, 2013) [available at: http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/being-regulated/meeting-your-
obligations/fair-treatment-of-customers/Culture; FSA, TCF – Towards fair outcomes for consumers (2006) [available at: 
http://www.fca.org.uk/static/ fca/documents/fsa-tcf-towards.pdf.]. 
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Investigations and enforcement also provide channels of communication and in that sense they are 
instrumental in forging a congruence of minds. The regulator’s enforcement strategy goes beyond 
penalizing unacceptable forms of business conduct. Like supervision, it targets culture securing at 
the same time some form of redress or other remedy for the aggrieved parties. The UK regulator 
tends to see the offender’s non compliance as an opportunity for the offender to reflect on what 
went wrong and make things right by taking remedial action, revising processes, practices, and 
ultimately its corporate culture.24 A&L demonstrates this quite well. A&L was ordered to pay the 
biggest fine for serious failings in the selling of PPI pre-crisis. However, A&L also agreed to 
implement a customer contract programme overseen by third-party accountants.  Under this 
programme, A&L undertook, amongst other things, to contact all customers that purchased PPI in 
conjunction with an unsecured loan, to review its policy in respect of product information that was 
sent to these customers, to review any rejected complaints and claims, and to pay redress where 
appropriate.   
 
More generally, the desirability of enforcement action is assessed in light of its likely impact on the 
industry’s capacity to develop patterns of self-regulation.  It is forward-looking in the sense that it 
aims to educate the regulated industry and to encourage a change of culture. Being partly premised 
on negotiation, the enforcement procedure itself creates opportunities for the alleged offender to 
deliberate with the regulator, become cognizant of its failure to comply, remedy any wrongdoing, 
and revise its business practice where appropriate. 
 
Discursive capabilities have their own limitations in promoting the requisite congruence of minds.25 
Given the limited space available, I will not give a comprehensive account of these limitations but for 
expository purposes I would like to note only two of them. The first one concerns culture. Culture 
becomes a focal point for deterrence because this is where to look at in order to find out whether 
the objectives, priorities and worldviews of the industry match those of the regulator. The expected 
benefits to gain out of placing emphasis on culture should not be blown out of proportion.  At least 
in part, the efficacy of the regulator to instigate cultural change depends on the willingness of the 
firms to genuinely engage with the regulator and – when challenged – to reflect on the soundness of 
their respective culture in order to amend business practices where appropriate.  Persistent industry 
regression leaves little scope for optimism.26  
 
Retail financial firms are not charities working in the interests of customers.  They are profit-driven 
institutions.  A business culture that ends up reflecting both the profit-driven character of the 
business and the firm’s perceived commitment to public policy goals, like fair treatment for 
customers, is bound to be self-defeating because it constitutes a contradiction in terms.  One must 
take priority, and quite intuitively this will have to be profit.  Otherwise, the business will not be able 
to survive.  This is not to say that no good can come out of business culture. It can, but in all 
probability, it is going to be less than we are inclined to think.  Profit-making considerations confine 
                                                          
24 This approach survived the upheaval of regulatory reform in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis and it is now 
crystallised in various dispute resolution provisions of the FCA Handbook.  
25 On the limitations of conversational regulation see A. Georgosouli, ‘The Revision of the FSA’s Approach to Regulation: An 
Incomplete Agenda?’ (2010) Issue 7 Journal of Business Law 599 at 604 and ‘The Nature of the FSA’s approach to 
regulation’ (2008) 28 Legal Studies 119 at 135.  
26 See discussion below at pages 9-12. 
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how far the regulator can go in aligning the goals and priorities of the industry with those of the 
regulator and, by implication, to what extent it is possible to rely on business culture. Accordingly, 
when relying on business culture a healthy dose of pragmatism is called for to make the credibility of 
the deterrence policy in the first place. 
 
Quite apart from the fact that that conversational capability breeds conditions of regulatory capture 
as a result of the close and on-going interaction of the regulator with the regulated industry, it is also 
liable to create another side effect. Market actors usually score high when asked to demonstrate 
that they endorse the priorities and aims of the regulator, while in practice exploiting every 
opportunity for contravention. The widespread practice of creative compliance demonstrates how 
well regulatees do in keeping appearances by engaging in a ‘box ticking’ exercise in their dealings 
with the regulator.27  
To conclude, congruence of minds is good but is not enough. The credibility of deterrence requires 
more than getting the members of the regulatory community see each others’ rationalities. As I 
argue below, it also calls for congruence of hearts. 
 
(b) Deterrence is not credible, unless there is a congruence of ‘hearts’ 
While conversational capacities harness cooperation between the regulator and the industry, the 
creation of a common language and increased familiarity with the rationalities of others are not 
enough on their own to ensure that the commitment of the industry to deliver the regulator’s 
agenda is actually genuine. Conversational capacity goes as far as to create a meeting of minds. It 
does not warranty a meeting of hearts. This is crucial but very hard to achieve as this meeting of 
hearts presupposes confidence that regulation is fair to all parties affected. Part of the problem 
derives from the presumably elusive nature of the principle of fairness in regulation. The vagueness 
of fairness means that regulators and policy makers are bound to encounter insurmountable 
practical difficulties in their attempt to improve the fairness of a particular regulatory regime. As it is 
commonly thought, fairness lacks a generally accepted definition and as a result it cannot be 
measured or accounted for in any tangible kind of way. The definitional argument has a kernel of 
truth but it is not entirely convincing.  
Quite apart from the fact that it is premised on the absurd expectation that for every principle, norm 
or doctrine there must always be an ex ante and ideally universally accepted understanding for 
otherwise public governance cannot work, this position seems to downplay the fact that the 
members of the regulatory community are actually furnished with all the linguistic and interpretive 
tools that are necessary in order for them to make sense of abstract terms and thus to overcome 
any definitional difficulties in real life situations.28 Sometimes they get the interpretation of 
principles like fairness right. Sometimes they get it wrong. It may also be the case that they take 
                                                          
27 D. McBarnet and C. Whelan, ‘The elusive spirit of the law: Formalism and the struggle for legal control’ (1991) 54 (6) 
Modern Law Review, 848-873. 
28 A. Georgosouli, ‘Regulatory interpretation: Conversational or Constructive?’ (2010) 30(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies; 
‘Judgement-led regulation: Reflections on data and discretion’ (2013) 14 Journal of Banking Regulation 209-220 at 215 
(providing brief examples). For a more comprehensive discussion in the literature of the philosophy of mind see notably D. 
Davidson, ‘What thought requires’ Essay 9 in Problems of Rationality 135 (USA: Oxford University Press; 2004) and 
‘Coherence theory of truth and knowledge’ Essay 10 in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective 137 at 138-140 (USA: Oxford 
University Press; 2001). 
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advantage of this interpretive practice to manipulate it in a way that serves their own interests. The 
fact remains that although they tend to disagree on the best interpretation of fairness they are still 
able to tell with some confidence when in the circumstances a certain interest group has been fairly 
treated and when it has not. For instance, it is hard to argue that consumer groups are treated fairly 
when they do not have the chance to participate and indeed to have their voice heard during public 
consultations about the introduction of substantial reforms to the existing regulation of the retail 
financial sector namely reforms that are going to have a major impact on them. To cut a long 
argument short, the practical difficulties that are associated with the vagueness of the principle of 
fairness should not be blown out of proportion and, in any case, they do not offer a valid reason for 
abandoning the idea of harnessing fairness capabilities in regulation all together.  
The importance of fairness in regulation seems to find support in current literature of compliance 
and enforcement. For example, in her critique of responsive regulation, Karen Yeung argues that we 
should not overlook the constitutional values of proportionality and consistency in enforcement, 
which are themselves rooted in the right to a fair and equal treatment.29 With respect to 
enforcement, the principle of proportionality, for instance, requires that the regulator’s action must 
be commensurate to the seriousness of the issue at hand. Crucially, the test of proportionality that 
Yeung proposes is not functional in nature. Rather it is substantive going beyond determinations 
that have as a point of reference the goal of effective future compliance without any due 
consideration to the nature and seriousness of the defendants’ violation.  
A conclusion to be drawn out of this analysis is that if we wish to cement the credibility of 
deterrence by winning the hearts of the industry, then we must find ways to improve the procedural 
fairness of the regulator’s strategy of compliance and enforcement. This is true but it tells half the 
story. Regulation promises benefits but comes with burdens and real life suggests that the 
regulator’s capacity to harness a sense of fairness in the sharing of burdens (substantive fairness) 
matters as well. Let’s take the example of the recent experience with the financial mis-selling saga in 
the UK. 30  The reaction of the industry reveals a more general concern with the fairness of the way 
in which the regulation of financial mis-selling allocates burdens among financial services and 
products providers and their customers.  
Following the long British tradition of self-regulation as the main conduit of cultural change, the 
Financial Services Authority initially internalised self-regulation into a government-based hybrid 
scheme of responsive regulation. It tried to engage with the industry in order to ensure that 
customers are treated fairly but the industry’s commitment to attune its business culture with the 
goals and priorities of the regulator’s agenda was nothing but genuine. The large number of 
Payment Protection Insrance (PPI) complaints about mis-selling practices that were referred to the 
Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) and the significant discrepancy in outcomes between PPI 
complaints that were handled by firms (a majority of which were rejected) and those that were 
                                                          
29 B. Morgan and K. Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Texts and Materials (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press; 2007) 201-202. For a more comprehensive discussion see K. Yeung, Securing Compliance (Oxford: OUP, 2004). 
30 The articulation of the principles of fairness in regulation falls beyond the scope of this chapter, however, one possibility 
is to follow the contractualist tradition in moral philosophy and argue that burden sharing must adhere to principles of 
justice that regulatees are taken to be able to justify to each other. On the contractualist school of thought see notably T. 
Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Harvard University Press, 2000). 
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referred to the FOS gave a very disappointing picture of the industry’s commitment.31  More recently 
this became evident in the industry’s attempt to challenge the FSA’s decision to take enforcement 
action in view of the industry’s failure to take into account FOS decisions in handling customer 
complaints contrary to the regulator’s expectation as it was communicated in a Policy Statement 
(“PS”).32 The industry eventually lost its case, but, in the course of bringing the action, several firms 
put on hold the handling of nearly all PPI complaints. This caused significant delays in the processing 
of financial redress to the victims of financial mis-seling. Most importantly though, it aggravated the 
situation in the eyes of the UK regulator and eroded any past attempts to build trust. The grounds of 
this deep resentment continue to keep momentum. For example, the length of time of the legal 
proceedings of the Keydata Investment Services case demonstrates how determined the industry 
continues to be in seeking to cause delays and more generally derail the regulator’s endeavours.33 
Judging from the history of PPI mis-seling, we can tell with some confidence that financial services 
providers fell short from complying with best practice in their dealings with customers. However, we 
should not be quick to vilify them or, indeed, to jump to the conclusion that their reluctance to 
commit to the FSA’s agenda was capricious. Clearly, they felt that they were made to bear more 
burdens in the delivery of fair treatment for clients than they ought to. For some financial firms, the 
burdens took the form of additional costs as a result of legal uncertainty given the informal nature of 
the Policy Statements through which the regulator communicated its expectations. For others, the 
burdens took the form of additional costs as a result of the eventual transformation of conduct of 
business requirements into a detailed set of legally binding rules –a development that also increased 
the risk of litigation. Yet for others, compliance with the relevant regulation meant investing time 
and resources to take action for matters that, in their view, were not their responsibility to do so –
most notably the review of complaints handling policies even in relation to transactions for which 
they had never received customer complaints.  
Taking things forward, the FCA’s policy of enforcement is not perfect but by and large it is consistent 
with constitutional principles like procedural due process, proportionality and equal treatment. 
Accordingly, in relation to the improvement of procedural fairness, the challenge at hand is not so 
much ensuring the constitutionality of the FCA’s compliance and enforcement but rather dealing 
with the more mundane issue of quality assurance in the handling and effective execution of 
investigations and enforcement proceedings, since procedural failings of that type offer grounds for 
judicial review. Cases like Angela Burns v FCA which was discussed above reveal that this is already a 
                                                          
31 A. Georgosouli ‘Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) Misselling: Some Lessons from the UK’ (2014) 21 (1) Connecticut 
Insurance Law Journal 261-288; E. Ferran, ‘Regulatory Lessons from the Payment Protection Insurance Mis-selling Scandal 
in the UK’ (2012) 13 European Business Organisation Law Review 247. 
32 R ex rel. British Bankers Association v FSA [2011] EWHC (Admin) 999.In its judicial review action the industry made three 
principal contentions.  The first was that PRIN are not actionable at a suit by a private person in view of the wording of old 
section 150 of the FSMA 2000. Accordingly, they could not give rise to redress obligations.  The second was that regulatory 
principles could not conflict with or augment specific rules. Finally, the third contention was that the existence of an 
alternative statutory collective redress scheme precluded the FSA from taking the action set out in the Policy Statement. 
33 S.O. Ford, M.J. Owen, P.F Johnson v FCA [2015] UKUT 0220(TCC) Case numbers FS/2014/0012, FS/2014/0013, 
FS/2014/0016 [available at http://www.tribunals.gov.uk/financeandtax/Documents/decisions/Ford-Owen-Johnson-v-FCA-
decision.pdf]. See further, FCA, FCA Press Release (26/5/2015, last modified 2/6/2015) ‘The FCA has today published 
Decision Notices in respect of three former members of Keydata’s senior management: Steward Ford (former chief 
executive), Mark Owen (Former Sales Director) and Peter Johnson (Former Compliance Office)’ [available at 
https://www.fca.org.uk/news/fca-published-decision-notices-three-former-members-keydatas-senior-management]. 
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source of concern.34 The FCA must now manage a growing number of investigations and 
enforcement but resources have not been increased to match up this trend. There is no magic 
solution to this problem. Either the FCA will have to reduce the number of cases that is handling 
concurrently or secure more public resources to train its staff and to fund its operations. 
Harnessing a sense of substantive fairness is far more challenging. In any case, there are steps that 
can be taken towards this direction. To return to the PPI mis-selling saga, obviously, the FCA need 
not agree with the industry’s understanding to what would amount to fair burden allocation to 
ensure that customers are treated fairly. All the FCA needs to do and in part already does is to 
challenge industry perceptions about fair burden allocation in a structured, consistent, time efficient 
and monitored fashion. This can be done by making more frequent use of rules which come with the 
requirement ‘to comply or explain’ and ad hoc communications as part of the supervisory process 
whereby FCA staff challenges the perceptions of fairness that are embedded in the business culture 
of the financial services and products provider in question. What is perhaps missing is the 
implementation of a comprehensive medium and long term ‘follow up’ process through which the 
FCA would return back to past wrong-doers to monitor how well they are doing in adhering with 
rules in an on-going basis rather than falling back to an attitude of treating the matter of compliance 
as an ‘one-off thing’.  
Asking financial services providers to bear the cost of customer protection is unlikely to be 
acceptable to them, unless the FCA demonstrably seeks ways to alleviate or otherwise reduce this 
cost. Clearly financial services and products providers of different size, expertise and level of 
sophistication have different capabilities to manage the cost of customer complaints due to alleged 
cases of financial mis-selling. The FCA must acknowledge this and be prepared to offer a ‘helping 
hand’ by providing, for example, guidance and expert advice to small size firms on what they ought 
to look for while reviewing customer complaints. Financial literacy can also reduce costs. For 
example, financially literate customers are more likely to be vigilant of misconduct and more likely to 
take initiative and protect themselves going down the route of the internal complaints procedures 
so that financial firms do not have to review past financial transactions to spot any instances of 
misconduct on their behalf. Like its predecessor, the FCA is taking measures to improve the financial 
literacy of the public but basic legal literacy is not included in the agenda.35 This is to be regretted as 
quite often consumers do not take any action out of fear of the cost or due to ignorance of the 
available means of redress. The results have been mixed so far and if anything they indicate that 
more needs to be done to discourage passivity and increase awareness.36   
 
(c) Deterrence is not credible, unless there is stakeholder confidence that the regulator is a 
‘credible’ enforcer 
                                                          
34 FCA v Angela Burns [2015] UKUT 0252 (TCC), Case Number FS/2012/0024 and, in particular, paragraphs 15 and 16 
[available at http://www.tribunals.gov.uk/financeandtax/Documents/decisions/Burns-v-FCA-penalty.pdf]. 
35 Legal literacy could be harnessed in partnership with public agencies and other professional bodies and associations that 
are involved in the regulation of the legal profession as, for example, the Legal Services Board and the Solicitors Regulation 
Authority. See further discussion below at page 14. 
36 See, for instance, FCA Press Release ‘FCA challenges firms to review approach to consumer vulnerability’ (23/2/2015) 
[available at: http://www.fca.org.uk/news/fca-challenges-firms-to-review-approach-to-consumer-vulnerability]. 
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It is naïve to think that increasing volume of enforcement cases boost the credibility of the FCA as 
enforcer. In fact, the profile of the FCA as a credible enforcer can be diluted by several factors. One 
of them is certainly the reception of bad press. As it was discussed in a previous section of this 
chapter, this is already concerning due to the FCA’s perceived mishandling of some of the recent 
enforcement cases. Historically, however, bad press seems to derive by the fact that enforcement 
action is not visible enough in view of the early settlement of many disputes.37 Early settlement may 
secure quick financial redress for the victims of misconduct but this is hardly registered in collective 
memory. By contrast, this lack of visibility fuels a sentiment that wrong-doers can get away because 
they can afford to pay the price of their wrong doing.  
 
New section 391 (1ZB) of the FSMA 2000 was inserted into the 2012 revised version of the FSMA in 
order to increase the visibility of the regulator’s disciplinary actions in the hope that this visibility will 
have the desired impact on behaviour modification. In theory, the FCA can now publish information 
about warning notices in certain cases but the relevant provision is complicated and drafted in such 
a level of detail that makes almost impossible to make a meaningful use of this option. A careful 
reading of the provision makes plain that the regulator must, inter alia, consult with the person to 
whom the notice is given.  In addition, the FCA’s power to publish information about warning notices 
is restricted by virtue of section 391(6), which prohibits the FCA from publishing information when 
the publication would be (a) unfair to the person against whom that action was proposed to be 
taken; (b) prejudicial to the interests of consumers; or (c) detrimental to the stability of the UK 
financial system.  
 
The difficulties with the application of these provisions also raise two further issues. The detailed 
drafting of the provisions makes it easier for resentful parties to file a successful lawsuit against the 
FCA if they feel that their human rights have been violated. With other words there is an increased 
risk of legal contestation. Furthermore, the delegation of powers that is difficult or impossible to use 
in any sort of meaningful way is probably not a wise policy choice because the FCA is likely to be 
caught in a future blame game, which will be difficult to handle. There is a simple reason for this.  If 
things were to go wrong the accusation would be that the FCA could have done something but it 
chose to do nothing. Limited time and resources to handle an ever-growing volume of investigations 
and enforcement also has its toll on the FCA’s capacity to cement its reputation as a credible 
enforcer. The institutional complexity within which the FCA performs its functions adds up to this 
problem.  
 
Experience in the UK suggests that the intensity of enforcement action varies and that it is by and 
large driven by the prevailing political climate.38  For example, if we look back in time a few years 
ago, the FSA’s willingness to proceed to formal enforcement gained momentum during the recent 
financial turmoil, that is to say, at a time when there has been great political pressure to bring cases 
to court.  As collective memory of the financial crisis of 2008 fades away, the regulator’s 
commitment to formal enforcement is expected to recede. To the extent that this pattern can be 
attributed to political happenstance rather than a principled decision to adapt the strategy of 
                                                          
37 In fact, the industry is given several incentives to opt for early settlement, such as discounts and the reduction of 
financial penalties FCA, Decision procedure and penalties manual para 6.7 (2014) [available at: 
http://media.fshandbook.info/content/FCA/ DEPP.pdf.].  
38 A. Georgosouli et al above paragraph 7.2.1. 
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deterrence in view of changes in the market environment, differences in the intensity of 
enforcement implies an inconsistent policy of deterrence. In the absence of a consistent strategy of 
deterrence, it hard to see how the FCA can possibly convey its seriousness of intention to pre-empt 
members of the industry from future misconduct. 
 
The analysis above does not provide an exhaustive account of the factors that impact on public 
confidence over the capacity of the FCA as a credible enforcer. Nevertheless, they highlight aspects 
of the deterrence policy of the FCA that call for revision and potentially reform. More public funding 
is required for the support the deterrence strategy of the FCA for otherwise the FCA will have to cut 
back on the volume of investigations and disciplinary and enforcement actions in order to ensure 
quality assurance in the execution of its statutory mandate. Legal reform is also recommended in 
order to rationalise the FCA rulebook, declutter the current institutional set up and ensure that the 
FCA is equipped with powers that it can actually make use of. All these are expected to reduce the 
time and cost of deterrence strategy but will not be enough to reinforce public confidence. Extra 
measures will be required to improve transparency. The FSMA 2012 lays down a sound system of 
accountability, which can be further improved by introducing an incentive-based performance index 
to assess how well the regulator does in reaching its deterrence targets.39 This is different from 
statistics providing numbers of lawsuits or aggregate amount of financial sanctions and penalties or 
financial redress secured for the victims over the years. While statistics provide data about the 
intensity of enforcement, the incentive-based performance index that is here proposed offers a 
more accurate picture of the impact of enforcement on culture modification by measuring the 
alignment of industry incentives with those of the regulator. The auditing of the regulator’s incentive 
could improve the regulator’s profile as a credible enforcer as long as it offers evidence-based data 
demonstrating that the regulator always acts having the public interest at heart.  
 
It is not enough for the FCA to be a successful enforcer; the FCA must come across as a credible 
enforcer to the eyes of the beholder. A question to ask here is who the beholder is. It comes 
naturally to think that the beholder is the industry since the industry provides the pool of future 
perpetrators of misconduct namely the target group of every deterrence strategy. This 
notwithstanding, the perceptions of future victims matter as well.  When future victims of 
misconduct are confident about the capabilities of the FCA as an enforcer, the profile of the FCA as a 
credible enforcer is fortified. Thus, it is likely to be taken more seriously by the industry.40 Moreover, 
the FCA has better chances to deter the industry from misconduct, when it ‘deters’ future victims 
from an attitude of apathy in respect of their right to seek compensation or other forms of remedial 
action and redress. This is also important because it means that future perpetrators of misconduct 
                                                          
39 The role of misaligned incentives in contributing to the recent financial crisis has been well documented in the literature. 
The relevant scholarship has two limbs. On the one hand, one finds a constellation of readings on the impact of industry 
incentives when these are not aligned with those of the regulators. Examples here include studies on the incentive of 
senior bank managers to secure short-term profits or to exploit public subsidies by creating banks that are ‘too big to fail’. 
On the other hand, one finds a growing volume of literature on the misalignment of regulators’ incentives in various 
institutional settings as this is manifested, for example, in their tendency to withhold information from others during times 
of crisis See generally, M Cihak, A Demirguc-Kunt and R. Barry Johnstin, ‘Incentive Audits: A New Approach to Financial 
Regulation’, Policy Research Working Paper 6308 (The World Bank Developments Research Group Finance and Private 
Sector Development Team, January 2013) with further references to the relevant scholarship. 
40 Although theoretically a danger here is that of a complacent regulator as there is no incentive to improve performance 
when the current and future victims of misconduct or perhaps other stakeholders no longer put pressure on the regulator 
to do a better job. 
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will have to think the prospect of the credible reaction of future victims of their misconduct in 
addition to the prospect of public enforcement before considering behaving ‘badly’. Of course, it 
would be absurd to suggest that the FCA ought to deter future apathy by ‘punishing’ existing victims 
who do not take initiative to receive the legal protection that they are entitled to. The only route 
seems to be changing consumer/customer culture through financial literacy and other consumer 
awareness initiatives. The FCA and other agencies like for example the Money Advice office do this 
already, although these initiatives may not be receiving enough press. In any case, there is no 
warranty that this will continue in the future. Unlike the FSA, the FCA must act at a time of austerity. 
Furthermore, it is not legally mandated by the FSMA to increase ‘public awareness’. As a matter of 
fact, the FCA is legally mandated to protect consumer interests by focusing on competition rather 
than financial literacy and education.41  
 
5. Conclusion 
It is hard to argue against deterrence. Despite the fact that the implementation of deterrence 
strategies is a challenging on-going process, everyone seems to accept that prevention is better than 
cure. Accordingly, the question to ask is how the regulator can do a better job in pre-empting future 
misconduct. It is widely accepted that deterrence is credible unless it is visible and that visibility 
requires emphasis on enforcement and harsh sanctions so that the industry takes it seriously and 
behave itself accordingly. In this chapter, I argued that, although enforcement (or rather the threat 
of it) is an undisputed incentive-modifying tool, the focus on enforcement is misplaced. Credibility is 
not secured by simply scaring regulatees off in the gloomy prospect of tough consequences as a 
punishment for their misbehaviour. Deterrence is not credible, unless there is a congruence of 
‘minds’ and a congruence of ‘hearts’ between the regulator and the members of the industry to 
whom deterrence measures (including but not limited to enforcement) are targeted. Last but not 
least, credibility calls for measures that strengthen the profile of the regulator as a credible enforcer. 
Enforcement or rather the threat of it plays a role in attuning industry incentives with those of the 
regulator but we are likely to do a better job in strengthening the incentive-alignment capacity of 
the existing regulatory approach to deterrence if we look elsewhere and in particular into issues 
concerning the organisational structure of the financial services provider and its regime of corporate 
governance. This can be done through the development and implementation of on-going incentive 
audits with respect to remuneration, executive compensation, accountability and legal liability in 
order to identify and monitor sources of conflicts of interest, moral hazard, organizational 
complexity, opacity and other features that affect the incentive structure that informs the setting of 
priorities and decision-making within these firms. Industry incentive audits are here recommended 
for an additional reason. The FCA is placing increasing emphasis on culture but culture cannot be 
enforced and is hard to regulate. Incentive audits can be the antidote to the perceived limitations of 
enforcement to modify culture to the extent that it is designed to spot triggers of incentive 
misalignment as these emerge. Incentive-based regulation is not a panacea but it pledges to add a 
                                                          
41 There is however a window of opportunity to argue that financial literacy programs are still legally mandated to the 
extent there is empirical evidence supporting the view that financial literate consumers improve competition in the 
financial services sector. 
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more tangible and pragmatic dimension to the existing deterrence strategy. This is reason enough to 
merit consideration.42  
 
                                                          
42 M. Cihak et al above at 12-13 (advocating for incentive-based regulation as a regulatory approach that pledges to be 
more dynamic and forward looking and to treat the underlying incentive issues that undermine regulatory effectiveness; 
not just the symptoms of regulatory failure). 
